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Individuality and Aggregativity
Stéphane Chauvier
Why is there a speciﬁc problem with biological individuality? Because the living realm
contains a wide range of exotic particular concrete entities that do not easily match our
ordinary concept of an individual. Slime moulds, dandelions, siphonophores are among
the Odd Entities that excite the ontological zeal of the philosophers of biology. Most of
these philosophers, however, seem to believe that these Odd Cases oblige us to reﬁne or
revise our common concept of an individual. They think, explicitly or tacitly, that to be a
living, evolutionary entity is to be a living individual. In this paper, we explore an alternat-
ive proposal: the variety and oddity of the forms of the living realm might be ontologically
regimented through an increase in the categorial complexity of the living realm, by admit-
ting, beside living individuals, living non-individuals or by acknowledging, more generally,
that the evolutionary development of the living forms is not necessarily a process of build-
ing individuals, that life is not necessarily individuals-oriented. We claim that, from an
ontological point of view, the spectacle of the living realm obliges us to take aggregativity
seriously.
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Editorial introduction: In this paper, Stéphane Chauvier makes a metaphysical objection
to one of the main debates in philosophy of biology, namely the debate over the notion
of biological individuality. Many philosophers of biology have argued that our traditional
concept of an individual is unable to account for the incredible diversity of living things.
Many colonial organisms, fungi, protists, symbiotic associations, etc. display features that
seem to violate several ‘classic’ criteria of individuality, such as boundedness or autonomy.
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But, Chauvier points out, there are many ways to exist in the living world without neces-
sarily existing as an individual. In other words, philosophers of biology might well have
mistakenly conﬂated existence and individuality.
One chief advantage of Chauvier’s proposal is that it brings together major debates in
metaphysics (e.g. the reality of aggregates, and part–whole relationships) and philosophy of
biology (e.g. major transitions in evolution). Yet further investigation might better connect
the two ﬁelds. For example, biologists and philosophers of biology have long taken into
account the existence of aggregates, but their question is: under which conditions does
an aggregate become an individual? It is not clear that the criteria they use to understand
this transition will be similar or the same as those suggested by Chauvier here. In most
cases, they use criteria grounded in biological domains or practices—such as ﬁtness-based or
histocompatibility-based considerations. It remains a key challenge to determine how these
biological criteria are related to metaphysical criteria such as those examined by Chauvier.
Another question pertains more directly to ontology per se. As explained in the general
introduction to this special issue, participants in the debates about the ontology of living
beings must specify how they understand the word ‘ontology.’ Chauvier concludes his con-
tribution with these words: ‘an individual-oriented ontology must go hand in hand with an
ontology of aggregativity.’ Does this mean that we have two distinct series of existing entit-
ies? If so, how do they interact? Do we, alternatively, have a single list of existing entities,
but a wide variety of such entities? If the latter, then do these entities exist in the same
sense and to the same degree (does a cluster of cells or a siphonophore exist in the same
way as a cat)? Since, like Leibniz, Chauvier seems to associate individuality with a speciﬁc
mode of reality—he writes, “We will use ‘entity’ to denote a phenomenally salient concrete
unity, that can turn out to be a real unitary being (an individual) or a stabilized aggregate
of real unitary beings (individuals)”—the ontologies of individuals and of aggregates might
perhaps end up diverging in their degree of existence or substantiality. –af/tp
When metaphysical problems are found to be intractable it is wise to adopt a critical attitude
towards them. One should assess whether the diﬃculties encountered stem from the problems
themselves, rather than a biased way of addressing them, from the presence of some unnoticed
prejudice that hinders the formulation of a simple solution.
It is this critical attitude that we would like to adopt in relation to the recalcitrant problem
of biological individuality. In our view, the diﬃculty of producing satisfactory criteria of biolo-
gical individuality cannot be entirely explained by the ontological bizarreness of living entities.
Another explanation registers on a methodological level and is tied to a kind of individualistic
prejudice, to the a priori idea that a genuine living entity has to be an individual.
Starting with a short characterization of the problem, wewill argue in favour of amore liberal
attitude, that we will label the Reﬂective Equilibrium Method, which, in our view, is immune
to any prejudice concerning the ontological orientation of the natural selection process.
1 Short Characterization of the Problem of Biological Individuality
In order to characterize the structure of the problem of biological individuality, it may be helpful
to call on the distinction between formal and material ontology, introduced by Husserl in his
Logical Investigations (Husserl 1970, III, §11). In Husserl’s view, ‘formal ontology’ is the part
of metaphysics that deals with universally or transcendentally applicable ontological concepts,
concepts that categorize every kind of being in the various realms of the natural and the social
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world. For Husserl, concepts such as object or part and whole are formal ontological concepts,
since we can ﬁnd objects or wholes in every material ﬁeld.
By contrast, material ontology deals with concrete categories of beings, such as sounds, feel-
ings, bits of matter, social institutions. The main aim of material ontology is to scrutinize the
speciﬁc ways these various concrete beings instantiate the formal ontological concepts. How, for
instance, is the part/whole relation ﬁgured when we consider an aria or a libretto or an institu-
tional entity such as a State?
Following the Husserlian distinction, the problem of biological individuality can be framed
as follows. On one hand, we have a ‘formal’ or ‘transcendental’ concept of an individual. The
concept is one that will be ﬂeshed out in due course, but for now let us say, roughly, that an
individual is a particular, bounded, concrete entity, which can be counted. In that general sense,
a god, an angel, a star, a cup of tea, a banking crisis can all be viewed as individuals in their own
realm. On the other hand, we have a speciﬁc material or regional realm, the realm of living
entities. And philosophers ask how the ‘formal’ or ‘transcendental’ concept of an individual can
map onto the diverse multitude of material, biological entities—from genes, to organisms, to
species. Which biological things count as individuals? How is the formal individual concept
instantiated in the living realm?
But it is quite clear that a material ontology cannot simply consist in the routinized ap-
plication of a formal concept to a material content. It might be a pleasant game—the game
of applying formal concepts to material contents—but it is not a serious cognitive matter. If
a material ontology in general and, in our case, an ontology of living beings or bio-ontology
is of scientiﬁc interest, it is because the living realm, as described by contemporary biological
sciences, is comprised of a wide range of particular concrete living entities which don’t easily
match our general or ‘formal’ concept of an individual. The literature on biological individuality
is full of Odd Cases, which disturb the use of our common concept of an individual and render
the question of biological individuality much more puzzling.
In our view, however, the existence of these Odd Cases (detailed below), does not, in and of
itself, suﬃciently explain the persistent debates concerning biological individuality. We think
the debate persists because there are two divergent paths to overcoming the mismatch between
the ‘formal’ and the ‘material,’ which correspond to two particular conceptions of the aims of
applicative metaphysics.
The Scientiﬁc Metaphysics View (as we will call it) sees the Odd Cases as obliging us to
revise or reﬁne our concept of an individual. More generally, proponents1 of the Scientiﬁc
Metaphysics View hold that the disconnect between ‘material’ and ‘formal’ legislates a revision
to the latter. The so-called formal ontology is mainly an oﬀ-ground speculation that has its
roots in the grammar of our natural language and in the habits of our perception; but—they
continue—if we want to know what there is, we shouldn’t investigate the form of our thought or
of perception but the discoveries of science. For proponents of the Scientiﬁc Metaphysics View,
we must therefore ﬁnd a deﬁnition of biological individuality that embraces the Odd Cases as
much as the ordinary cases; and the problem arises because the Odd Cases are often very odd, so
the working out of a consistent and satisfying concept of biological individuality faces persistent
diﬃculties.
However, there are other views on oﬀer. Contrary to the Scientiﬁc Metaphysics View, the
Reﬂective Equilibrium View (as we will call it) does not necessarily call for a revision or excision
of the ‘old-fashioned,’ ‘formal’ concept of the individual, because we can be content with this
1Cf. for instance Ladyman & Ross 2007. We will see in conclusion that the problem with this view
is not its scientiﬁc orientation, but its individuals-oriented view of the evolution of life forms.
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formal concept so long as it appears to be consistent and applicable in the various material
realms. The solution could either come in the form of a revision of our formal concept, or
the introduction of another ontological category, the choice between revision and increased
categorial complexity being a matter of what we propose to call a ‘reﬂective equilibrium’ (to
redeploy Rawls’s term from Rawls 1999, 18–19).
Our point is that the problem of biological individuality is not necessarily solved through
the speciﬁcation of a ‘new’ individual concept, which can cover the variety of forms found in
the living realm and mirror the world as described by the biological sciences. The problem of
biological individuality may be better solved through an increase in categorial complexity of
the living realm, by admitting, beside living individuals, living non-individuals or by admitting,
more generally, that the historical development of the living forms is not necessarily a process
of individuals building, that life is not necessarily individuals-oriented.
2 Two Sources of the Problem of Biological Individuality
The living realm hosts concrete living entities2 whose behaviour, ontologically speaking, fails to
match easily with our formal concept of an individual. The literature on biological individuality
is full of Odd Cases that obviously disturb the use of our individual concept. However we pro-
pose to make a distinction between two very diﬀerent sources of disturbance in the application
of the concept to the living realm.
One source of disturbance is tied with the role of Natural Selection Theory in the economy
of the biological sciences. A number of authors believe that the fundamental entities of the
living realm are those to which natural selection applies, the so-called units of selection. This
means that we can use natural selection theory as a tracker of biological fundamentality, i.e. which
entities are fundamental, explanatorily (and perhaps ontologically), when explaining biological
phenomena—from microscopic interactions, to macroscopic ﬂuctuations. What seems to us
somewhat puzzling is that the problem of biological fundamentality is equated with the prob-
lem of biological individuality. The prevalent assumption seems to be that if something is a
unit of selection or a ‘fundamental’ biological entity, it must therefore be an individual. Accord-
ingly, genes, populations, species are mooted as individuals, because they are all possible units
of selection (Hull 1978).
Unfortunately, we fail to see a compelling reason for such a connection. We do not see,
particularly, why the fact that a population, a group or a species being a unit of selection would
imply that it must be an individual. The unity of a unit of selection need not be of the kind
that is typical of an individual. There are clearly various forms and grades of unity. As we will
see below, a great number of natural or social aggregates have an internal unity; this does not
imply they are individuals. So it seems to us that the defenders of the Unity of Selection View
of Biological Individuality have to establish independently that nothing can be a unit of selection
if it is not a genuine individual—and we are not sure that there is a proof of that general thesis.
Let us leave this concern to one side. Another source of the problem of biological individu-
ality—much more resistant or serious in our view—is the fact that life contains living entities
for which we may hesitate between two interpretations: treating the entity as a concrete aggreg-
ate of smaller individuals or treating the living entity as what we will label a super-individual,
namely a real individual, but which is composed of actual or of potential individuals.
2We will use ‘entity’ to denote a phenomenally salient concrete unity, that can turn out to be a real
unitary being (an individual) or a stabilized aggregate of real unitary beings (individuals).
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This particular ontological problem is a variant of the general problem of the One and the
Many. Much of the time, there is no real diﬃculty in asserting that a concrete whole is more
than a concrete collection of material parts, that it has a proper unity and is a proper subject
of actions and passions. But in the living world, we ﬁnd some more puzzling cases, wherein it
genuinely isn’t clear whether some thing is an individual (One) or an aggregate (Many).
Every puzzling case we will consider concerns entities that are spatially extended and boun-
ded. We know of no case in which a single living entity is widely scattered with, for instance,
a part in Japan and another in Australia. Of course, ‘bounded’ does not mean that every part
is contiguous with some others part, that the entity doesn’t contain any holes or internal empty
spaces. But there is always a global mass of living matter, a biomass, that has spatial boundaries,
even fuzzy boundaries, forming a phenomenally salient concrete unity.
Among these puzzling Odd Cases, which perfuse the literature, we think a distinction can
be made:
1. We may have a spatially-extended and bounded living entity that can be seen either
as an aggregate of qualitatively identical individuals (Many) or as a large, genetically-
homogeneous individual (One). For example: slime moulds, a ﬁeld of dandelions, a coral
reef, a forest of quaking aspens (and, more generally, a clonal colony).
Within this class, there is a further distinction to be made: (i) In some cases, the qualitat-
ively identical parts are physically related by various biological appendices, and are vitally
connected to one another (e.g. slimemoulds, quaking aspens, gigantic fungi). (ii) In other
cases, the qualitatively identical parts are spatially separated, but have a common origin:
they form a clonal lineage, as though a single individual has duplicated itself, reiterated
by each clonal duplicate an indeﬁnite number of times (e.g. dandelions, clonal bacteria
colonies).
2. We may also have a spatially-extended and bounded entity that can be seen either as a
structured aggregate of heterogeneous living individuals or as a super-individual made up
of actual living individuals.
Themain instances of this are the colonial siphonophores, including the famous Portuguese
man of war, but others include concrete communities of bees, termites, and ants (and,
in another register, the pervasive phenomena of symbiosis). Though diverse, from an
ontological point of view these instances can be gathered together, for they all disclose
the same formal structure: that of the division of a common biological labour between
distinct individuals.
Common to (1) and (2) is the fact that we can identify, within the concrete holistic entity, a set
of parts that, if encountered in isolation elsewhere, would be viewed as discrete individuals. The
main diﬀerence between (1) and (2) is that in the ﬁrst, the individualizable parts form, together,
an unstructured agglomerate, while in the second cases, we ﬁnd a structuration or a functional
integration of these individualizable parts.
With these diﬀerent varieties of Odd Cases in mind, we will try to give an illustration of the
Reﬂective Equilibrium Method mentioned above. Accepting that the task of a ‘material onto-
logy’ is to arbitrate between ontological revisionism and categorial complexity, our point is that
the existence of these Odd Cases—the main root of the problem of biological individuality—
does not necessarily legislate a revision of our formal concept of an individual. Furthermore,
we will maintain, attention to these aspects of the living realm obliges us to take aggregativity
seriously.
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3 Individuals, Mixtures, Aggregates and Conglomerates
(A) Individuals
Before trying to ‘take aggregativity seriously,’ it is important to take individuality precisely ( …
if, perhaps, a little bit dogmatically3). We will sketch the two relevant levels of analysis of the
individual concept: the ‘formal’ and the ‘material’ (biological).
(1) Let’s begin with what we have called the ‘formal’ concept of an individual. There is, in
our view, an important distinction to be made between a logical–cognitive concept of
an individual and an ontological one. It is frequently said that an individual is a partic-
ular, bounded, concrete entity, which can be counted and re-identiﬁed (See for instance
Strawson 1959, part 1, passim). This, however, is insuﬃcient when we take the concept
of an individual as an ontological concept: something more must be said about its meta-
physical character.
There are three further features of the concept of an individual that are worthy of mention:
(i) One basic and traditional feature of ontological individuality, one ‘existential moment’
of individuality, to use Roman Ingarden’s terminology, is ontological separateness.4 An
individual must be, to put it in an old-fashioned way, an ens per se and not an ens in alio
and per alio. It must have its ‘proper being’ and not the being of another with which
it forms an existential whole This doesn’t mean, of course, that an individual cannot be
causally related to other things, that it has to be an absolute being. It only means that an
individual must be, in a certain sense, independent. For instance, Socrates is an individual,
but his nose is not, even if we can treat his nose as a discrete particular, countable and re-
identiﬁable—the reason is that Socrates’s nose is dependent, for its existence on Socrates
himself: its being is the being of Socrates, while the being of Socrates is his own.5 An
individual is then an ens per se, while a non-individual, even a concrete non-individual, is
an ens in alio or an ontologically dependent entity.
(ii) Another basic feature of ontological individuality is formal indivisibility. To quote the
seventeen-century philosopher Stephanus Chauvinus: ‘We call properly individual, not
what cannot in any way be divided, but what cannot be divided into several individuals
of the same kind as itself or into several individuals speciﬁcally similar to him.’6 Here
3For a less dogmatic analysis of the formal concept of individual, cf. Chauvier 2016.
4Or self-suﬃciency (Selbstständigkeit), by contrast with inseparateness or not-self-suﬃciency (Un-
selbstständigkeit). See Ingarden 2013, §14. Self-suﬃciency or separateness, in Ingarden’s terminology,
must not be confused with what he calls existential autonomy. Autonomy is an ‘existential moment’ of
every real beings, by contrast with the ‘heteronomy’ of intentional beings (such as ﬁctional entities). One
can note however that if we set aside Ingarden’s theory of intentional being, if we only admit real being,
existential autonomy could be use as a synonymous of existential separateness or self-suﬃciency, while hetero-
nomy would be another name of not self-suﬃciency. We will ourselves speak below of biological autonomy
in the separateness sense of the word. See Johansson 2013 for a systematic analysis of Ingarden’s ‘ways
of being’ and ‘existential moments.’
5One could say that the being of Socrates is the being of the Universe, of which Socrates is a part,
as in Spinoza’s pantheistic ontology. But this implies that there exists only one individual, the Universe
itself. To use Russell’s terminology, there is a real problem of characterizing individuality only if we adopt
a pluralist ontology, not a monist one.
6‘Individuum vero dicitur, non quod omnino dividi not possit, sed quod ita ut singulare sit ut dividi neut-
iquam queat in plura particularia, in plura talia quale est ipsum, in pluri sibi similia individua.’ Stephanus
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the distinction is not between independent and dependent beings, but between things
that have a structural form and things that are only a piling up of other things, what we
may call a conglomerate. It is, for instance, the diﬀerence between a particular rabbit and
a particular pile of sand grains.
(iii) A third feature of individuality, we may label determinative singularity. Individuality
relies on there being something that makes some entity diﬀerent from every other thing
(even if we, with our ﬁnite human minds, are unable to distinguish it in every context). If
we follow Leibniz, we may even assert, a priori, that there is always a qualitative diﬀerence
which explains the individuality of an entity, that which makes it this individual thing and
not some other. But if we are reluctant to employ such a notion of haecceity, we must at
least admit that an individual bears some determination, even external or relational, that
permits its identiﬁcation and re-identiﬁcation. This feature also gives sense to the fact
that there can be degrees of individuality: there is a lesser degree of individuality amongst
a set of qualitatively identical individuals, such as industrial duplicates, than amongst a
set of qualitatively distinct individuals. The ontological concept of an individual is a scalar
concept, for there are grades of individuality.
Thus, a concrete entity is:
(i) ontologically separate
(ii) formally indivisible
(iii) qualitatively singular
These criteria are ‘formal’ in the sense that they are not speciﬁc to any material realm:
any individual—an angel, an historical event, a State, as much as a living organism—will
exhibit these three basic properties.
(2) The second level of analysis of the individual concept is the ‘material’ level of biological
individuality. What is a biological individual? We ﬁnd in the literature on biological
individuality various criteria of biological individuality:
• reproduction or generational persistence
• genetic homogeneity
• sexual reproducibility
• bottleneck life cycle
• germa-soma separation
• functional integrity and policy mechanisms
• histocompatibility
• ﬁtness maximisation7
All these criteria are, at least in their formulation, peculiar to the living realm. But how
do they function in relation to individuality? The defenders of the Scientiﬁc Metaphysic
View might argue that they serve as possible components of a scientiﬁc re-deﬁnition of
the word ‘individual,’ to be contrasted with the oﬀ-ground formal deﬁnition of that term.
It seems to us, however, that these criteria rather serve to translate or transpose in biological
terms what it is, for a living entity, to have ontological separateness (i) formal indivisibility
(ii) or determinative singularity (iii). Let us brieﬂy expound this idea.
Chauvinus (1692, 315).
7All these criteria are from Clarke 2010.
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(i) How do we express, in biological terms, the diﬀerence between ens per se and ens in alio?
The formal concept of ens per semight be schematized or translated by contrasting entities
that have a proper life and a proper cycle of life, going from birth to death, and entities that
are living in another or per another, entities whose life is the life of another.
The autonomy of life criterion is diﬃcult to apply. Yet, it seems clear that the life of a cell,
say, within a multicellular organism is, to use the Husserlian vocabulary, grounded in the
life of the whole to which it belongs. A cell, if we set aside the possibility of its artiﬁcial
persistence in vitro, cannot have a ‘proper life’ (and even in vitro, there is doubt). Its life
is grounded on the life of another.8
(ii) If we admit that an individual, in every realm, must be formally indivisible, that its
material division would destroy its proper form or internal structure, then we should be
able to express this criterion of indivisibility in biological terms.
It is here that we ﬁnd criteria which focus on ‘organismality,’ ‘functional integrity,’ on
policy mechanisms which preserve the ‘solidarity’ of the parts, and on ‘cohesiveness’—
that is, on all the criteria which aim to express the fact that a biological individual is
biologically indivisible, that we lose the whole if we subtract or destroy some of its vital
parts.
(iii) Finally, if an individual must have a determinative singularity, we will also have to
express this idea in biological terms. We will ﬁnd here criteria such as ‘genetic singularity’
and ‘homogeneity,’ ‘unity of cellular origin,’ ‘bottleneck cycle of life,’ etc.—that is, all
criteria that try to express that which is constitutive of the qualitative singularity of a
living thing.
Here, then, we have a ‘translation’ or transposition of the formal concept of an individual. If
an individual is, formally speaking, a concrete entity characterized by ontological separateness
or autonomy,9 formal indivisibility and qualitative singularity, a biological individual will be a
concrete living entity that is simultaneously characterized by what I will label bio-autonomy, bio-
indivisibility and bio-singularity, the precise meaning of these basic properties being expressed
in the scientiﬁc terms outlined above.
A property of a living thing is considered as a criteria of biological individuality because
these ‘scientiﬁc’ properties serve to schematize the formal requirement of individuality: we select
these properties as constitutive of biological individuality, because we knew previously what sort
of properties, amongst the various properties of a living thing, could serve as criteria or marks
of individuality.
(B) Mixtures and aggregates
The problem of biological individuality arises from the attempt to transpose our ‘formal’ concept
of an individual into diverse areas in the material realm. If we simply translate in biological
terms the formal content, the resulting notion of biological individuality is problematic because
the requirements of bio-autonomy, of bio-indivisibility and of bio-singularity fail to be satisﬁed
8It is very important to distinguish the ontological relation of groundingwith themuchmore common
phenomena of causal dependence. Any living individual depends causally on a great lot of interactions
with its environment to stay alive. But it has its proper life, which is only sustained by these causal
interactions. By contrast, a living part that is founded on the life of the whole to which it belongs
borrows its life from the life of the whole or it lives the life of the whole.
9See footnote 4.
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by the Odd Cases. It is here, then, that we have to make a choice: should we decouple the
biological concept of an individual from the formal one? Or must we recognize that not all
living entities are individuals, that there are non-individual living entities?
Our sympathies lie with the latter option. In order to make it more palatable, it will be
helpful to ﬂesh out an alternative category into which living entities may be place—the category
of aggregates. There are numerous works in traditional metaphysics on aggregates. Here, we will
brieﬂy mention two of them.
In his correspondence with Arnauld (Leibniz 1960, letter XVI, 90–102), Leibniz contrasts
the true beings that have ‘real unity,’ the monads, with what he labels ‘aggregates.’ Contrary
to a monad, an aggregate is unum per accidens. However, importantly, Leibniz also recognizes
that there are grades of aggregativity, as there are grades of unity (because, for instance, there is
more unity in an organized human society than in a crowd, more unity in a machine than in a
human organized society). An aggregate can then be more than a simple conglomerate, it may
have a stability that gives it a temporal persistence. (Though, of course, ontologically speaking,
an aggregate remains for Leibniz, a phenomenal being, namely a being whose unity is not ‘real’
but only for an observer.)
Besides Leibniz’s view of aggregativity, we ﬁnd another useful passage, in Aristotle’s De
generatione et corruptione (327 a30–328 b20). Therein, we encounter the two concepts of mixis
and of synthesis: mixture and (as we will parse it) aggregate. Here, Aristotle is interested in
determining the conceptual plausibility of ‘mixtures.’ The puzzle runs thus: A mixture is made
of qualitatively diﬀerent components, but if the components remain qualitatively distinct in
the mixture, there is no mixture. And if they completely disappear, being replaced by a novel
substance, there is also no mixture.
Aristotle stipulates that a mixture’s components must subsist in such a way that they could
be separated, that they could be extracted from the mixture. A mixture is not an irreversible
transubstantiation. Further, it is essential that the components do not subsist within the mix-
ture as qualitatively distinct components. To resolve the puzzle, Aristotle suggests that the
components of a mixture do not subsist actually as qualitatively distinct components, but only
in potentia. They lose their actual distinctness, but they remain potentially discernable, if they
were subtracted from the mixture.
The thought that emerges is that amixture can be divided into homogeneous parts, which are
qualitatively identical with the whole. Amixture is a homeomeric entity. To highlight this prop-
erty, Aristotle introduces the concept of a synthesis–which we have rendered as ‘aggregate’—as
a contrast. In an aggregate, contrary to a mixture, the components remain actually qualitatively
distinct components. For that reason, the dissolution of an aggregate results in parts that are
not qualitatively identical with the whole.
An aggregate (a synthesis) is, for Aristotle, not a real unity; it is only from the point of view
of the perception (aesthesis) that an aggregate appears as a unitary entity. In itself, it is only an
agglomeration of distinct components.
For present purposes, these views on aggregativity will help to characterize, in clearer terms,
the concept of an aggregate:
(i) The formal concept of an aggregate is the concept of a plurality of individual concrete
entities that have an external unity. An aggregate is not One thing, but Many.
(ii) However, as Aristotle and Leibniz suggest, there are grades of aggregativity. An aggregate
can be a simple conglomerate of material individuals piled up on the top of each other, as
in a pile of sand.
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(iii) An aggregate can also be a mixture, in which the individual parts lose their actual indi-
viduality and form a concrete homogeneous entity.
(iv) When individual living components of a biological aggregate interact with one another,
their proper ‘vitality’10 can be boosted by their aggregation. In such cases, even if the aggreg-
ation remains an external relation, it produces internal positive eﬀects on the components
(explaining why such an aggregation can be biologically beneﬁcial to the components).
4 Reﬂective Equilibria
Let us now return to the Reﬂective Equilibrium Method, mentioned above, by reviewing some
of the aforementioned ‘Odd Cases.’ As noted, we may distinguish two general puzzling cases:
in one, we have a concrete whole whose parts are homogeneous. In another, we have a concrete
whole whose parts are qualitatively diﬀerentiated.
Let us consider, as a representative of the ﬁrst type of case, the gigantic fungus—Armillaria
bulbosa—which, in the Northern Michigan Hardwood Forest, occupies a minimum of 15 hec-
tares, weighs more than 10,000 kg and has remained genetically stable for more than 1,500 years
(Smith et al. 1992). This odd entity satisﬁes both the criteria of bio-autonomy and bio-singularity,
but it does not satisfy the requirement of bio-indivisibility (for that unitary entity could be really
or physically divided in shorter parts, salva vitalitate). Is A. bulbosa One thing or Many? We
have to make a choice between two possibilities: We might revise our concept of an individual or
we might increase categorial complexity. Contrary to a heteronomous (diﬀerentiated) organism,
the fungus can be divided in such a way that the products of the division are individuals of the
same kind as the whole from which they proceed. Thus, A. bulbosa might lead us to introduce
the concept of something like an accidental individual, a genuine individual that could however
be many individuals if it was physically divided. This would be a case of revising our formal
concept of an individual by introducing a diﬀerence between essential and accidental individuals.
Alternatively, we might opt to increase categorial complexity. Because A. bulbosa is not indivisible,
because its real physical nature is constituted by a web of intertwined hyphae which count as
clonal indivisible individuals, it is a mixture of individuals, therefore not itself One individual
but Many, whose proper lives are however boosted by their physical aggregation.
The second class of puzzle cases—the class of the concrete entities made of diﬀerentiated
individualized parts—comprises at least two diﬀerent sub-cases. (i) Cases emerging from the
pervasive phenomenon of symbiosis, where a dominant individual is biologically associated with
other hosted individuals. (ii) The fascinating class of siphonophores, where a concrete living
entity, develops as many individual entities collaborating with one another. In both cases, the
requirement of bio-indivisibility is satisﬁed, but there is some hesitation for the requirements of
bio-autonomy and of bio-singularity because of the presence of a plurality of individuals.
Let us ﬁrst consider the symbiosis cases. We must again make the choice between revising
our concept of an individual and increasing categorial complexity. Because a host–symbiont associ-
ation is made of genetically diﬀerent individuals, which preserve their individual nature during
symbiosis, it is diﬃcult to treat a concrete singular host–symbiont association as a genuine indi-
vidual. However, because of the reciprocal vital dependence between the dominant individual
and its endosymbionts, we can be tempted to assimilate the vital interdependence of the in-
dividuals to the vital interdependence of organs within a genuine organism. We could then
decide to introduce the concept of a super-individual to capture that analogy with the internal
structure of an organism, all the while taking into account the diﬀerentiated biological nature
10‘Vitality’ can here be understood as temporal longevity and aptitude to reproduction.
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of the associates. A super-individual might satisfy the requirement of bio-autonomy and of
bio-indivisibility, but not of bio-singularity, for it is composed of a plurality of genetically dif-
ferentiated individuals. A super-individual would then be an individual that is made of actually
distinct individuals.
Alternatively, again we might opt for an increase in categorial complexity. The phenomena
of symbiosis can also be viewed as a boosting aggregation, which implies that the associated
individuals are not simply piled up, as is the case in a conglomerate (cf. 3 (B) supra), but that
they are internally and beneﬁcially supported and boosted, thanks to the correspondence of
their own biological activities. We could then view a host–symbiont association as a biologically
stabilized aggregate, unable to reproduce itself (a host–symbiont association is not (or at least,
not uncontroversially) an unity of reproduction), but able to function as a real biological attractor
of diﬀerentiated individuals.
When we turn to siphonophores,11 the hesitation between the One and the Many is much
more critical than in the case of symbionts. Not only do we have an entity that satisﬁes the
requisite of bio-indivisibility, it also satisﬁes the requirement of bio-singularity. A siphonophore
develops from a fertilized egg that ﬁrst becomes a singular zooid which, through a form of
budding, in turn gives birth to other diﬀerentiated zooids. Each zooid in the siphonophore is
of a sort that has solitary exemplars elsewhere in nature, but when they are situated within a
siphonophore, they become specialized like an organ in an organism.
The choice here is more complex. We can choose between (i) Genuine individuality—if we
consider that, towards the requirements of bio-indivisibility and bio-singularity, the requirement
of bio-autonomy is satisﬁed by the fact that the whole has a unique cycle of life, a unity of birth
and of death. (ii) Super-individuality—if we consider that each zooid is genetically identical
with the others but, speciﬁcally, of a diﬀerent sort or variety than the others and that some
of the conspeciﬁcs of each zooid actually may exist apart in nature (polyps). (iii) Stabilized
aggregativity—if we consider that each zooid has, strictly speaking, its own cycle of living and
process of behaving, all these cycles and processes being simply synchronized with one another.
5 Adjudications
How can we adjudicate between these various possibilities? Why would one prefer a revision of
our core individual concept (admitting ‘accidental’ individuals and ‘super-individuals’) to an in-
crease in categorial complexity (admitting, in the living realm, mixtures and stabilized aggregates
beside organic individuals?). The adjudication cannot be a matter of taste or pragmatic conveni-
ence: if metaphysics aims at true knowledge, if it aims to tell us what there really is, the choice
between revisionary individuality and stabilized aggregativity must include an answer to a much
more fundamental question, which concerns what we may call the ‘predominant ontological ori-
entation of the historical life process.’
Two opposite answers can, in principle, be given to this question. Firstly, we can adopt
an Individuals-Oriented View of the historical development of life. According to this view, the
development of living forms has to be seen as a process of individuals building; each new living
form, stabilized by natural selection, is necessarily a new kind of individual, made up of previ-
ous simpler individuals. Here, there is a kind of analytical link between life and individuality:
individuality is a necessary condition of the stability in duration and in reproduction of a life
form.
11Materials below come from http://www.siphonophores.org/SiphOrganization.php.
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Yet the Individuals-Oriented View is not the only acceptable conception of the ontological
orientation of life historical process. An alternate view is the Aggregates-Oriented View of
the development of life. According to this view, the historical development of living forms,
through natural selection, could be seen as a process of aggregation of simpler living entities, a
process that can contain—locally, but not universally—processes of individualization or of super-
individualization. According to this conception, the default-setting of the life building process
would be aggregation, the stabilization of an aggregate being the verdict of natural selection
mechanisms. Individualization would then only be a supplementary grade of aggregation, a
kind of fusion of the Many into the One, that would occur only when it would give a selective
advantage to the One over the (stabilized) Many.
It seems to us that neither of these extreme views is true, but, also, that neither is false! The
question of the predominant ontological orientation of the life historical process is not a purely
speculative one. This question can ﬁnd a mid-theoretical, mid-empirical treatment though the
identiﬁcation and the explanation of what Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1995) called the
major transitions in evolution. In a recent synthetic paper, to the richness of which we cannot do
due justice, West et al. (2015)12 have proposed a general model of what they call ‘major evolu-
tionary transitions in individuality.’ Such a formulation seems to imply that the authors adopt
the Individuals-Oriented View of life historical process. The details of their model, however,
suggest a more nuanced position. According to their analysis “in each transition, a group of in-
dividuals that could previously replicate independently cooperate to form a new, more complex
life form” (Ibid., 10112). More precisely:
amajor evolutionary transition is deﬁned by two conditions. First, entities that were
capable of independent replication before the transition can replicate only as part
of a larger unit after it, termed mutual dependence, interdependence or contingent
irreversibility. Second, there is a relative lack of within-group conﬂict such that the
larger unit can be thought of as a ﬁtness-maximizing individual (or organism) in
its own right. […] When these two conditions are met, evolution can lead to a
new higher level individual (organism). We have a group that can’t be broken up
(condition 1) and we can conceptualize the group with a single purpose, where the
interests of the previously independent individuals are now aligned (condition 2).
(Ibid.)
For our purpose, the main point here is that the emergence of new kinds of individuals, made
from simpler cooperating individuals, is, of course, not a teleological process. Some logically
necessary but empirically contingent conditions are required for the emergence of the One out
of the Many and it can be the case that these conditions aren’t met. ‘For example, clonal multi-
cellular groups have led to animals and plants whereas nonclonal multicellular groups have led
to things like slime moulds’ (Ibid., 101117).
This means that even if major evolutionary transitions are transitions towards individual-
ity and if it is the achievement of individuality that makes them major transitions, the funda-
mental process from which individuals emerge can also lead to non-individualized cooperative
aggregates, because some necessary conditions of individuality are lacking: the components can
continue to reproduce independently or the whole can be broken up, salva vitalitate. But the
stability of these non-individualized aggregates suggests that life evolution can also be content,
at least marginally, with reversible biological cooperation.
12Thanks to Thomas Pradeu for this reference.
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So even if individualization appears as a critical step in evolution, individualization super-
venes on a more basic aggregation trend: one that may sometimes fall short of an individualized
form.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have contrasted the Scientiﬁc Metaphysics View of the problem of biological
individuality with the Reﬂective Equilibrium View of that problem. It appears now more clearly
that behind these two divergent methodologies, there is a deeper divide between two diﬀerent
views of what we may call the ontological orientation of the evolution of life. The methodolo-
gical parti pris of the ‘Scientiﬁc Metaphysics View’ is in fact the methodological consequence
of the general assertion that every living concrete entity, stabilized by natural selection, must
count as an individual. It is because of this assertion concerning the ontological orientation of
life that the scientiﬁc metaphysician is committed to accept that individual-hood is much more
complicated, much more diversiﬁed than what our common concept of an individual allows.
But such an Individuals-Oriented View of the evolution of life forms must be tempered by
what we can now called an ‘Aggregates-Deviation’ View of the evolution of life forms. Even if
stabilized aggregates are not always major life forms, they are real living entities. The problem
of biological individuality is then as much an invitation to critically revise or reﬁne our common
concept of an individual than to pay attention to the categorical richness of the concrete non-
individuals.
The lesson we can glean from the problem of biological individuality is that an individual-
oriented ontology must go hand in hand with an ontology of aggregativity.
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